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PROCEDURAL DISARRAY IN ILLINOIS
ORDINANCE PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION

The system governing the prosecution of ordinance violation cases is
presently under attack in Illinois. Defendants' rights are being denied because certain aspects of the procedure applied in ordinance prosecution
cases present serious due process and equal protection problems. This
Comment will discuss the nature of the problems in this area, examine
past and present ordinance prosecution in Illinois, analyze the studies of
those committees and individuals who have worked to improve the system,

and make recommendations for change in the procedures followed in the
prosecution of Illinois ordinance violation cases.
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

There has been a substantial degree of ambiguity regarding the proper
procedures to be followed in prosecuting ordinance violations. This ambiguity arises from the courts' attempt to handle such diverse subjects as
disorderly conduct,' prostitution 2 gambling,3 housing code violations, 4 traffic offenses, 5 and possession of burglar's tools 6 under one system of procedure. Rather than continually straining to classify these dissimilar offenses together under an artificial heading such as "quasi-criminal," '7 ra1.

CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch.

193, § 193-1 (1974).

Note, however,

that § 193-1 (i) was held unconstitutional in Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. MosIcy, 408 U.S. 92 (1927).
2. CHIcAGo, ILL., MUrNCIPAxL CODE ch. 193, § 192-1.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 191-1 to -10.
§§ 39-1 to -13.
§§ 27-200 to -437.
§ 193-10.

7. "Quasi-criminal" is a term used to denote the prosecution of ordinance violations generally involving proscribed behavior of minor "blameworthiness" and

handled in a civil context. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 19 Ill.
2d 204,
166 N.E.2d 29 (1960); Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Ill.
2d 117, 139 N.E.2d
233 (1956); City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 111. 360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912); Village
of Midlothian v. Walling, 118 Ill.
App. 2d 358, 255 N.E.2d 23 (1st Dist. 1969); City
of Chicago v. Lewis, 28 Ill. App. 2d 189, 171 N.E.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1960); City of
Chicago v. Dryier, 325 Ill.
App. 258, 59 N.E.2d 700 (1st Dist. 1945); City of Chicago v. Baranov, 189 Ill. App. 2d (1st Dist. 1914). The offenses included in this

588

1975]

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE PROSECUTION

589

tional guidelines are needed to provide procedures suitably related to the
nature of the specific offense involved.
The problems created by the ambiguity as to the procedure must be
resolved in order to promote reasonableness and essential fairness in the
administration of these cases. These problems are a result of the grouping
of offenses of a regulatory nature with those which traditionally have been
treated as criminal. Since all "quasi-criminal" offenses have been treated
as "civil in form," defendants in those cases which are substantially
criminal have consistently been denied the constitutional protections guaranteed to defendants in criminal cases. Recognizing that the prosecution
of criminal cases without the protections of criminal procedure was a
serious problem, the General Assembly amended the Illinois Municipal
Code in 1970 to require that violations of all municipal ordinances punishable by incarceration be prosecuted under the rules of criminal procedure.8
While this amendment alleviated the problem for defendants in the more
serious ordinance violation cases, it did nothing to improve the situtation
for defendants who only would be subject to the sanction of a fine in
ordinance violation cases of a criminal nature. The granting of protections
guaranteed defendants in criminal cases should not turn merely on the
severity of the punishment; instead, protections should be granted according to the essential nature of the offense. Due process requires some procedural safeguards in what are essentially criminal cases, regardless of the
specific classification of the offense. 9 Thus, by continuing to prosecute
categorization represent diverse areas of regulation having as a common element their
mode of prosecution. The majority of appellate cases establishing the rule structure
for "quasi-criminal" litigation have involved situations in which the penalty was a
fine rather than a jail sentence. See, e.g., City of Danville v. Hartshorn, 53 I11.2d
399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Ill. 2d 117, 139
N.E.2d 233 (1956); City of Chicago v. Kiger, 130 Ill. App. 2d 162, 264 N.E.2d 488
(1st Dist. 1970).

8. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 24, § 1-2-1.1 (1973).

9. The United States Supreme Court has recently propounded the logical argument that procedural safeguards must be provided if due process is to be accorded
a defendant, regardless of the class of offense with which he or she is charged. It
stands to reason that to insure that due process is guaranteed throughout all judicial
administration, it must be granted in every circumstance regardless of the fact that
the violation is of a municipal ordinance. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, it was held
that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). See also Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore.
94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969).
The principle that due process must be respected regardless of the specific classification involved was also upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). The Court held that successive prosecutions for the
same offense by a state and by a municipality within that state are prohibited by the
double jeopardy clause. Id. at 395. The Illinois Supreme Court interprets Waller
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many ordinance violation cases under non-criminal procedure, without
attention to the nature of the offense, Illinois courts have denied and continue to deny due process of law to defendants in those ordinance cases
which are essentially criminal.
The problem presented above has been noted by Illinois courts. In an
attempt to bring the procedural structure of "quasi-criminal" prosecutions
into line with the mandate of constitutional due process, some criminal
protections have been provided on an ad hoc basis in ordinance cases.10
Practically, this process has created a system in which each court arbitrarily determines its own rules of procedure. The failure to give adequate
notice of the applicable procedures in a particular case places the accused
at a severe disadvantage, denying the essential fairness of court proceed12
ings required by due process. 1 ' Reform may take one step at a time,
but in the realm of procedure, reform that creates uncertainty and is subject to arbitrary application is no reform at all. The granting of criminal
protections must be done on a unified basis. This would accomplish the
desired result of meeting the constitutional directives without the creation
of ancillary due process problems.
In addition to the problems created by the irrational grouping of varied
ordinances under the "quasi-criminal" heading, a further problem is
created by the dual system of prosecution which exists in Illinois. Many
ordinances and state statutes deal with the same subjects.' 3 This dual
system of laws places great discretionary powers in the arresting officer
and prosecuting officials who determine whether a defendant will be
charged under the state statute or an ordinance. That determination
affects the procedure to be followed and the rights to be granted a defendant. The probability that this power will be abused is great because there
are no guidelines for choosing one system over another. This lack of
as being applicable to prosecutions of fine only ordinance violations. People v. Allison, 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 80 (1970).
10. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 52 Ill. 2d 470, 288 N.E.2d 396 (1972); People
v. Allison, 46 Ill.2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 80 (1970).
11. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. (1 Wall. )223 (1864).
12. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
13. See, e.g., disorderly conduct: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1 (1973), CHICAGO,
ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193, § 193-1 (1974); traffic violations: ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2 (1973), CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL COlE ch. 27, §§ 27-200 to -437 (1974);
gambling: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1 (1973), CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE
ch. 191, §§ 191-1 to -10 (1974); prostitution: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-14
(1973), CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 192, §§ 192-1 to -5 (1974).

1975]

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE PROSECUTION

guidelines creates an equal protection problem because like offenders may
4
be prosecuted under different systems of procedure.'
It could be argued that the area of ordinance prosecution does not merit
the expenditure of valuable time and energy by the General Assembly and
the Illinois Supreme Court. These cases deal with relatively minor
matters, and a system already exists to deal with ordinance cases adequately. However, constitutional directives should not be ignored simply
because the infringement of individual rights is slight. The assurance of
due process and equal protection is essential to the legitimacy of the legal
system. A system of law which is arbitrary and capricious and deals differently with citizens in similar positions cannot command the respect of
the citizens who are to be bound by that system. Our society is one based
on the premise of social contract. Citizens agree to be bound by the laws
on the condition that those laws will deal fairly with, and treat equally,
all citizens. It is the government's compliance with the terms of this contract that legitimates the laws promulgated and differentiates our government from one which bases its authority on raw power. 15
On occasion, the policy of promoting the efficiency of judicial administration comes into conflict with the policy of providing essential fairness
in judicial proceedings. A high value is placed on administrative efficiency, but a higher value is placed on the legitimacy of authority. Viewed
in this light, the argument that individual rights must give way to judicial
administration is clearly specious. Legitimacy must be maintained in
every example of public ordering, including municipal ordinance prosecution. The greatest number of citizens have their contact with the judicial
system at the municipal level. 16 If the citizenry is to accept and submit
to a government of laws, the legitimacy of the system must be demonstrated at the point where the citizens are most likely to encounter the
14. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if defendants in
like circumstances are not afforded the same procedural rights, they are being denied
equal protection. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Missouri Pac.
R. Co. v. Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914). The discretionary powers created in the
arresting officers and prosecuting officials are a. quirk of Illinois law that emerged
because of the random development of law at different levels of government. This
discretion does not represent any policy or objective of the state. If such a policy
or objective could be found, there might be a reason to continue this dual system
of prosecution. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), Chief Justice Warren stated that a difference in the treatment of individuals did not in and of itself
violate equal protection, but where the difference in treatment had a basis which was
wholly irrelevant to a state objective, the differentiation did violate equal protection.
366 U.S. at 425-26.
15. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 4 (1921).
16. Murphy, The Role of the Police in Our Modern Society, 26 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 292, 293 (1971).
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system. This principle is supported by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 61
(c) (1) which provides:
The Integrity of Our Legal System. A judge should bear in mind that ours
is a government of law and not of men and that his duty is the application
of general law to particular instances.

He should administer the office with

due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
17
he is not a depositary [sic] of arbitrary powers, but a judge under the law.
STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL HISTORY

"Quasi-criminal" litigation in Illinois chronicles a lack of procedural uniformity and a consistent disregard for the constitutional protection of defendants' rights. In the early development of Illinois jurisprudence, ordinance prosecutions which provided the potential for fine only were handled
as civil matters. Early cases held that a municipal corporation could recover a fine in an action of debt or assumpsit, and the municipality had
the power to pursue such actions in any court of general jurisdiction, other
than criminal court. 18
The Justices and Constables Act' 9 gave justices of the peace and police
magistrates original jurisdiction over municipal ordinance violations. 20 In
these actions, both the prosecution and defense had a right to demand a
jury trial. Originally, under the common law, jury trial did not extend
to all crimes against public laws but only to the more serious ones. The
right to a trial by jury was created by the above mentioned Act, 2' and
as such had only a statutory basis in Illinois.
With the repeal of the Justices and Constables Act, the Illinois courts
were faced with a vacuum of authority for the procedure to be followed
in the trial of municipal ordinance cases. This gave rise to an ad hoe
system of procedure, the application of which varied greatly from court
to court. The only common line running through the cases was the repeated use of the magical incantation "civil in form although quasi-criminal in character. ' 22 Unfortunately, this oft quoted phrase did not estab17.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 A, § 61(c)(1) (1973).

18. Town of Jacksonville v. Block, 36 Ill. 508 (1865); Ewbanks v. President &
177 (1864).
Trustees, 36 Ill.
19. Act of April 15, 1895, ch. 79, [1895] ILL. REV. STAT. (repealed 1965)
[hereinafter cited as

JUSTICES AND CONSTABLES ACT].

20. Id. at art. V, § 1:
Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction in their respective counties in . . .
actions .. .arising under the laws for incorporation of cities, towns, and
villages, or any ordinance passed in pursuance thereof.

21. JUSTICES AND CONSTABLES ACT, supra note 19.
22. City of Chicago v. Franklin, 126 Il. App. 2d 43, 49, 261 N.E.2d 506, 510
(1st Dist. 1970); City of Chicago v. Thomas, 102 Ill. App. 2d 143, 150, 243 N.E.2d
572, 576 (1st Dist. 1968).
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lish a sufficient guideline for the courts to follow.
An illustration of this uncertainty in municipal ordinance prosecution
is the courts' treatment of the burden of proof issue. In a regular civil
suit, the quantum of proof required is "a preponderance of the evidence. '23
In a criminal suit, the requirement is "beyond a reasonable doubt."
However, in City of Chicago v. Joyce,24 a public demonstration-disorderly
conduct case, the burden of proof was held to be a "clear preponderance
of the evidence."' 25 This standard seems to fall somewhere between the
civil and criminal requirements.
Bail, a procedure characteristic of a criminal proceeding, 26
is another
example of the courts' deviation from a strictly civil format in municipal
23. Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 335 Ill. 164, 171-72, 166 N.E. 530,
534 (1929); Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 II1. 207, 210-11, 158 N.E.
380, 382 (1927); Sharp v. Brown, 349 Il. App. 269, 272-74, 110 N.E.2d 541, 543
(3d Dist. 1953); Slovinski v. Beasley, 316 I11.App. 273, 277, 45 N.E.2d 42, 44 (4th
Dist. 1942).
24. 38 Ill. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 289 (1967).
25. Id. at 373.
It is normally held that the burden of proof in a civil action is merely a preponderance of the evidence. See note 23, supra. This means that the slightest quantum
of evidence over 50% would satisfy this standard.

However, in City of Chicago v.

Carney, 34 Ill. App. 2d 303, 305-06, 180 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1st Dist. 1962) the court
stated:
[T]he rule is that the violation of the ordinance must be proved like any
ordinary civil suit for the recovery of a penalty, by a "clear" preponderance
or by more than a "mere" preponderance of the evidence (citing City of
Chicago v. Butler Bros., 350 I11.App. 550, 554, 113 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1st
Dist. 1953); City of Chicago v. Akins, 19 Ill. App.2d 177, 182, 153 N.E.2d
302, 304 (1st Dist. 1958).
It is questionable whether the use of the word "clear" in relation to the burden
of proof in a civil case is of any value. In Teter v. Spooner, 305 111. 198, 137 N.E.
129 (1922), the court stated:
The use of the adjectives "slight" and "clear," with reference to the preponderance of the evidence required to sustain an issue, is only confusing to
the jury. They ought not to be used in instructions in any case. Nobody
knows what is a slight preponderance or what is a clear preponderance of
the evidence, although everyone knows what is meant by a preponderance
of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence is necessarily clear even
though it is slight. If there is a perceptible preponderance of the evidence
it is sufficient, but it would not be proper for the court to give an instruction to the jury that a perceptible preponderance of the evidence was sufficient, any more than a clear preponderance of the evidence was required.
The effect of the adjectives is merely to confuse the jury and invite them
to minimize or maximize the weight of the evidence on one side or the
other. Such instructions ought not to be given.
ld. at 211, 137 N.E.2d at 135.
26. R. MICHAEL & J. HEINZ, PROCEDURES IN CRIMINAL AND ORDINANCE VIOLATION CASES, (unpublished REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (1972)).
[hereinafter cited as MICHAEL & HEINZ].
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ordinance prosecution. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules specifically
provide for bail in ordinance violation cases.2 7 Similarly, the Illinois
courts have denied defendants in municipal ordinance cases the protection
of the Insolvent Debtors Act, 28 stating in effect that these cases are
really criminal.29 Thus, a distinction is made as to the criminal character of the proceeding for purposes of denying protection under the Insolvent Debtors Act. However, on the issue of whether a decision could
be appealed by the prosecution, the courts have emphasized the civil aspect of the litigation, thus exposing the defendant to what would be characterized as double jeopardy if it occurred in a full fledged criminal prosecution. 30 These examples are indicative of the valuelessness of the characterization "quasi-criminal in nature, civil in form." Truly, the defendant
is an ordinance violation case is exposed to "The Worst of All Possible
Worlds."1'
The most significant defect in this type of litigation is the fact that while
many courts have recognized they are dealing with criminal responsibility,
they have consistently denied defendants the safeguards of criminal procedure. These have included, for example, the full protection provided
by the fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination. The Supreme
Court has held that in an action which is essentially criminal in nature,
the full protections provided by the fifth amendment should be insured; 32
the courts of Illinois have recognized this principle.3 3 Equally distressing
is the fact that many of the courts in the. State have failed to provide a
jury trial on demand, a right that was recognized for seventy years under
the Justices and Constables Act 3 4
27.
28.
29.

ch. 110 A, §§ 526, 528A (1973).
ch. 72 (1973).
The statute authorizing the imprisonment and enforced labor, in case of
ILL.
ILL.

REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.

non-payment of fines imposed under the ordinances of a city, was designed
for the punishment of those-offenders whose want of tangible property
would otherwise place them beyond the reach of city discipline . . .and
it is to be regarded merely as an alternative mode of punishment.
Fosselman v. City of Springfield, 38 Il1. App. 2961 302 (3d Dist. 1890), affd, 139
11. 185, 28 N.E. 916 (1891).
30. Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Il.2d 117, 139 N.E.2d 233 (1956). The
Illinois courts now hold that such cases are not appealable as to allow appeal would
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. People v. Allison, 46 Ill. 2d 147,
263 N.E.2d 80 (1970). See also Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
31. Meade, Defending an Illinois Proceeding for Violation of a Municipal Ordinance: The Worst of All Possible' Worlds, 1 LOYOLA CmI. L. J. 86 (1970).

32. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.'616 (1886).
33. City of Chicago v. Berg, 48 Ill.
App. 2d 251, 260 (1st Dist. 1964); City of
Chicago v. Lord, 7 Ill.
2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955).
34. JUSTICES AND CONsTfimLEs"AcT, supra'note 19, art. V § 1. See City of Danville v. Hartshorn, 131 I11.
App. 2d 999, 268 N.E.2d 878 (4th Disi. 1971), wherein

the court failed to provide a jury trial on demand.
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The recent case of City of Danville v. Hartshorn3" demonstrates the
problems inherent in "quasi-criminal" litigation in Illinois. On the one hand,
the Court upheld the right to a jury trial since it is essential to an action.
which is criminal in nature, 36 and on the other hand, denied the discovery.
procedures provided for in the Civil Practice Act. ' 7 This case is consistent
within itself. The judge characterized: the action as criminal in nature
whereby the right to a jury trial attached but the broad discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act were not applicable. The problem is that a
potential defendant will not know in advance of a judge's determination.
whether-the prosecution will be governed under criminal or civil procedure.
The result is that the judges of Illinois still have no real precedent to follow.
because each court can arbitrarily characterize an action as criminal or
civil and thereby determine which procedural rules will apply.
THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
to each individual equal protection of the laws, including local laws.
Legislative classifications must be rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose and not discriminate invidiously against persons similarly sit-.
38
uated.
In presenting the nature of the problem, it'has been shown that Illinois
often' has a dual system of - prosecution covering substantially the same
behavior. The duplication of many state statutes by municipal ordinances
leaves the choice of applicable law to the decision of a police officer or
other local enforcement official.
Such a system is susceptible to abuse. In many cases the penalty for
violation of a s tate 'staitute is much greater than for violation of a municipal.
ordinance. 39 The arresting officer who desires to be.punitive may simply.
charge the individual under the state statute. Such discretion distorts the
role of the law enforcement officer who was never. meant to have the
power to adjudicate.
Perhaps, the greatest discretion in relation to these proceedings lies with
35. 53 II1. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973). The defendant in this case Was
charged with violating an ordinance of the City of Danville which prohibited the
hindrance, resistance or obstruction of any police officer in the discharge, of duty.
The penalty provided by the ordinance was a fine.
,36. Id. at 403, 292 N.E.2d at 385..
37. Id. at 404, 292 N.E.2d at 385.
38. See note 14 supra.,.
39. E.g., compare ILL. REv, STAT. ch. 38, § 11-14 (1973), (up to1 year impris-,
onment), with CHICAGO, ILL., MyVNICIPA.L. CODE. c.h. 192,. § 19275.1 (1974), (fine.
not to exceed $200).
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the trial court judge. Due to the vagueness of the rule structure, the judge
is more or less at liberty to utilize the procedure for litigation which he
or she deems appropriate. This discretionary power is a result of the
courts' attempts to remedy inadequacies in the proceedings. Each
remedial attempt has added a new provision to the existing rule structure.
These additions have produced a situation where a judge could find precedent for any course of procedure he or she might select.40 City of Danville v. Hartshorn is indicative of this procedural miasma. 4' Each court
42
that considered the case applied a different system of procedure.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the lack of procedural uniformity throughout the state. This serious deficiency of due process should
provide the impetus to revise the procedure presently followed in "quasicriminal" litigation in Illinois. This lack of uniformity, especially in light
of Waller v. Florida43 and Argersinger v. Hamlin,44 demonstrates that
the present handling of municipal ordinance violation cases is violative of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 45 A definite and invariable set of procedures should be
applied in ordinance cases to meet the constitutional requirements. In
iWaller, the Supreme Court held that constitutional safeguards, such as
the double jeopardy restraints, must be applied in essentially criminal
cases. The state may not consider an ordinance proceeding as merely
a device for regulating municipal affairs and ignore the fact that a de40. E.g., compare Village of Park Forest v. Nickolas, 103 Ill.
App. 2d 99, 243
N.E.2d 421 (lst Dist. 1968) with City of Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. 2d 366, 308
N.E.2d 601 (1974).
41. 53 Ill. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
42. In Danville, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in refusing to
allow the defendant pre-trial discovery as a matter of right, that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial, and that the city should have been required to answer written interrogatories. 131 Ill.
App. 2d 999, 1003, 268 N.E.2d 878, 881-82 (4th Dist:
1971).
The Supreme Court held that the defendant, indeed, had a right to a jury trial,
but that civil pre-trial discovery procedures were not to be granted as a matter of
right, rather their provision should be within the discretion of the court. 53 III. 2d
399, 403-04, 292 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1973).

43. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). See note 9 supra.
44. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See note 9 supra.
45. The fundamental requirement of due procesi is an opportunity to be heard
upon such notice and according to those procedures as are adequate to safeguard the
rights for which the constitutional protection is invoked. Anderson Natl Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
If a defendant is denied adequate notice of the procedures to be applied in his case,
he cannot properly prepare his defense. It is not sufficient to satisfy due process
that the defendant is given an opportunity to be heard; the hearing must be at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
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fendant's rights must be protected. Illinois' classification of municipal ordinance violation cases as "quasi-criminal in nature but civil in form" is
directly at odds with Waller. Due process requires procedural safeguards
in essentially criminal cases, regardless of a state's labeling the cases as
civil in form.4 6 The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Allison 47 has
explicitedly accepted the Waller holding that successive prosecution for
the same offense by the state and by a municipality within the state are
prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. In
People v. Allison the Illinois Supreme Court stipulated that Waller applied
to all ordinance prosecutions including those which imposed a fine only.
This holding suggests that the supreme court agrees that these cases are
essentially criminal. Due process cannot be satisfied by granting defendants' rights on a piecemeal basis; defendants must be given the full gamut
48
of rights applicable to all criminal proceedings.
HISTORY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEES

In December of 1969, the Supreme Court of Illinois created the Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Quasi-Criminal Litigation to study and make
recommendations regarding the Illinois procedures for prosecuting ordinance violations. A report was submitted in August, 1971, upon which no
official action has been taken. In March, 1972, the Annual Associate
Judges Seminar considered the issue and a report containing the judges'
proposals was drafted by Richard Michael and John P. Heinz. After considering this report, the Illinois Judicial Conference's Executive Committee appointed another committee headed by John P. Heinz of Northwestern University College of Law to provide answers to questions which
had not been covered in previous reports, most importantly the effect the
recommendations would have on the autonomy of local governments. Essentially, the report of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on QuasiCriminal Litigation and the report submitted by Michael and Heinz in conjunction with the Associate Judges Seminar contained the same recommendations:
1. Pre-emption of OrdinancesWhich Duplicate State Statutes
The committee suggested -that the state legislature provide for preemption of all local ordinances imposing sanctions on behavior covered
by the Illinois Criminal Code. 49 Some doubts were raised as to whether
46. See note 9 supra.
47. 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 80 (1970).
48. See note 9 supra.
49.

FINAL REPORT OF THE

ILLINOIS SUPREME

COURT COMMITTEE ON

QuAsI-
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the General Assembly has the authority to adopt this pre-emption proposal
in view of the power granted to home rule units to punish by imprisonment
up to six months. 50 The report of the Associate Judges Seminar pointed
out the constitutional authority for such a proposal:
The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive
exercise by the State of any power of function of a home rule unit other
than a taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (1) [sic]
of this Section. 51

2.

OrdinancesProviding for Jail Sentences

Where there is a possibility of incarceration for violation of an ordinance, prosecution should be treated as a criminal matter, both procedurally and as to burden of proof, with the primary responsibility for prosecution resting upon the city attorney or village prosecutor. 52 The recommendation is based on Section 1-2-1.1 of the Municipal Code, 58 which
states that wherever there is the possibility of incarceration, the prosecution will be handled in compliance with the Criminal Code of Illinois.
3. OrdinancesProviding for "Fine Only"

(a) That ordinance violations be treated as civil proceedings both procedurally and as to burden of proof where there is no chance of imprisonment.5 4 (b) That civil rules of discovery shall not be applicable to these
proceedings without leave of court.55 (c) In order to stress the civil nature of the proceedings, that the term "penalty" should be substituted for
the term "fine." 5 6
4.

ProhibitionAgainst Compulsory Imprisonment to "Work-Off" Fine

Article I, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution-of 1970 prohibits compulsory imprisonment to "work-off" a fine which has been converted to
a jail sentence because of indigency. A defendant who is unable to satisfy
a money judgment in an ordinance violation case should not be incarcerCRIMINAL LITIGATION at 6, August 13, 1971 (unpublished committee report used with
the permission of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts.) [hereinafter cited
as ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE].
50. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (1970).
51. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(h) (1970).
52. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, supra note 49, at 1-2.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-2-1.1(1973).
54. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, supra note 49, at 5; MICHAEL &
HEINZ, supra note 26, at 9.
55. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, supra note 49,,at 2.

56.

Id. at 3.
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ated unless there is willful refusal on his part to satisfy the judgment, in
57
which case a defendant could be jailed for contempt of court.
5.

Disbursement of Money Judgment Awards

Monies raised as a result of these recommendations should be dispersed
by the municipality, county, or state whose law enforcement officer or
other official initiated the proceedings. 58
Although this Comment is in basic agreement with the recommendations
of the various committtees, we must take strong issue with what are considered to be the underlying bases for these recommendations. Their
premises, although not incorrect, are seriously deficient because of their
almost total disregard for the constitutional mandates of due process and
equal protection. By ignoring these constitutional directives, the Committees have undermined the legal foundations of their recommendations
and have lessened their impact. It is these underlying principles which
necessitate the revision of -the procedures to be followed in "quasi-criminal" litigation.
PROPOSAL

Alternatives
The major purpose of this Comment is to aid in the restructuring of
the procedure to govern the prosecution of ordinance violations. This
must be done in a manner which insures that the constitutional guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment and the directives of the
Illinois constitution relating to trials are met. There are a number of possible alternative solutions which may produce the desired result.
It has been suggested that the procedural muddle which exists in ordinance prosecution could be eliminated by providing for the prosecution of
all ordinance violations as either strictly criminal or purely civil matters. 59
The idea of treating all matters under one system of procedure appears
attractive because it would eliminate the confusion as to which set of procedures would be applicable to a given case. Treatment of all ordinance
prosecutions as criminal matters would seem to eliminate the constitutional
problems inherent in the present system of operation and would provide
certainty. Unfortunately, such an approach would not completely eliminate all the constitutional prob'ems; the duplication of state statutes by local
57.
58.

59.

Id. at 2-3. See also Tate v. Short, 399 U.S. 925 (1971).
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, supra note 49, at 7.
See MICHAEL & HEINZ, supra note 26.
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ordinances giving rise to different treatment of individuals similarly situated because of differing penalties and procedures would still present
equal protection problems. In addition, treating all ordinance prosecutions as criminal matters might put substantial burdens on the administration of justice in Illinois. Treating regulatory matters as criminal attaches
a stigma to them which may not be justified by the underlying behavior
or the results achieved. In fact, it may actually be desirable to decriminalize many of these regulatory matters, as criminal treatment has not
been particularly effective. 60
Another alternative would be to handle all ordinance prosecutions under
the Civil Practice Act. 6 ' The main advantage of handling local ordinance violations as purely civil matters lies in the policy of decriminalization
of matters which are actually regulatory schemes. While this approach
is in line with the recent trend, 2 and would provide a solution to the
practical problems of the area, it would not sufficiently meet the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. Some ordinances deal with matters which are criminal and should be treated as such.
Duplication would still exist and the mandate to provide the criminal protections dictated by A rgersingerand other cases would still remain.
A third alternative would be the creation of a new code of procedure
to set rules to be followed in all ordinance prosecutions. Through such
an attempt, a system could be devised whereby the constitutional directives could be met without putting the substantial burden on the administration of justice that would result from treating all ordinance prosecutions
as strictly criminal. Although -this alternative would create a uniform system for ordinance prosecution, -the confusion that would be generated by
the implementation of a new code, without a history of development
through reasoned elaboration, would hardly clarify or improve present
practice.
One other possible alternative is that reached by the Committees which
have previously studied the problem at the discretion of the Illinois Supreme Court. 63 The crux of their recommendations has already been discussed. Although the Committees' recommendations come closest to approximating the desired result, these recommendations must be expanded
upon in order to adequately resolve all the problems presented by the
prosecution of local ordinance violations.
60. See R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1973).
62. People v. Loevy, 2 Ill. App. 3d 407, 275 N.E.2d 434 (2d Dist. 1971); Village
of Park Forest v. Nicklas, 103 Il1.App. 2d 99, 243 N.E.2d 421 (1st Dist. 1968).
63. See text at pp. 597-99 supra.
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To devise a system that will deal rationally with ordinance litigation,
the following elements must be taken into account: (1) Due process problems presented by the arbitrary procedures followed under the present system; (2) Equal protection problems created by the duplication of state
statutes by local ordinances; (3) Rationality of treatment of the varied
ordinances as criminal or civil matters; (4) The dimunition of local autonomy established for home rule units by the 1970 Constitution. One
solution to this problem requires that several steps be taken to effect a
rational restructuring of ordinance prosecution procedures.
The Pre-emption of All Local Ordinances Which Duplicate State Statutes
In every case where a state statute is duplicated by a local ordinance,
pre-emption could be effected in order to eliminate the equal protection
problems discussed above. Two examples of necessary pre-emption statutes are set out in the Appendix. All ordinances which duplicate provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code, 64 the Illinois Vehicle Code, 65 and
any other ordinances which duplicate state statutes must also be preempted. Article VII, §§ 6(g), (h) and (i) of the Illinois Constitution
of 197066 provide the structure for pre-emption. This pre-emption could
probably be effected by simple majority vote of the General Assembly under section 6(h).67 This should apply to traffic ordinances as well as offenses duplicating the Criminal Code. An issue is raised as to whether
traffic ordinances could be pre-empted by simple majority vote. The
General Assembly may pre-empt by simple majority when the State is active in the field. 68 The policy underlying pre-emption is the state's interest in uniformity as balanced against the need for systems tailored for
varied local conditions. 69 The pre-emption of traffic ordinances is controversial because the area has been considered to be one uniquely within
the competency of local governmental bodies. However, the primary
interest of local governments is directed to the revenues produced by the
collection of fines. A stipulation in the pre-emption bill that the governmental body initiating the prosecution would receive the revenue pro64.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973).

65. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 (1973).
66. ILL. CONsT. art. VII, §§ 6(g), (h), (i) (1970).
67. Id. at § 6(h).
68. Id. But see § 6(m).
69. See Note, Kanellos v. County of Cook-The Clean Slate Doctrine: A Liberal Construction of the Scope of Illinois Home Rule Powers, 23 DEPAUL L. REv.,
1298, 1311-12 (1974).
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duced would probably meet the concern of the local governments. Because the only ordinances eliminated would be those which duplicated
existing state statutes, the local government would retain the same power
to regulate the affected behavior as before pre-emption. This would
eliminate the possibilities for arbitrary exercise of discretion by local law
enforcement and prosecuting officials. One of the. main considerations
present in ruling on the competency of a local governmental body to deal
with a given matter is "the effect that treatment of a matter as local or
statewide would have on the administration of justice."' 70 This proposal
would achieve the policy of "the protection of private interests against the
arbitrary exercise of local power."'' 1
Retention of duplicative traffic
ordinances would inhibit the rational development of ordinance prosecution and defeat state policy. In weighing local prerogatives, one must look
to "the relative importance of a local policy which is in conflict with a
72
state or federal policy."
In the recent case of Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago,73 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a bill pre-empting the right of local governments
to regulate several professions. The court reasoned that the bill was not
confined to one subject as required by article IV, section 8(d) of the 1970
Constitution, which provides in relevant part, "[b]ills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws,
shall be confined to one subject."'7 4 The limitation established by Fuehrmeyer may not apply to the pre-emption package because it could be considered a revision of the laws establishing the procedure for ordinance
prosecutions.. If the pre-emption of duplicating ordinances does not fall
into the exception provided for the revision or rearrangement of laws, preemption could still be accomplished merely by passing a bill covering the
specific area involved. The number of bills required would be small as
one bill could pre-empt all duplications of the Criminal Code and one bill
could pre-empt all duplications of the Vehicle Code and still fit within
a strict reading of Fuehrmeyer.
70. Id. at 1312.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 57 Ill.
2d 193, 311 N.E.2d 116 (1974). It is likely that Fuehrmeyer may
be limited to its facts. Basically, this case represented an attempt by the Illinois Supreme Court to protect home rule powers from blanket laundry list pre-emptions. A
contrary holding in this case would have prevented local governmental units from
taking regulatory measures in relation to thirty different professions ranging from
real estate brokers to doctors.
74. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
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THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE JUDICIARY TO
INITIATE THE CHANGE

The governmental body most competent to effect the necessary changes
in ordinance violation procedure is the Illinois Supreme Court. It may
recommend the bills necessary to remedy these problems to the legislature.
The Illinois Supreme Court is most competent to deal with problems of
judicial administration because it is familiar with the present functioning
of the Illinois courts in ordinance prosecutions and has an understanding
of the nature of the problems in this area and the kinds of remedial action

necessary to alleviate these problems.
It is a traditional argument that the separation of powers doctrine re-

quires that the impetus for legislation come from the representative body
of government. This type of an argument is sophomoric and disregards
the close interaction between the courts and the legislature that is vital

to insure a system of public ordering which is responsive to the needs of
the people. The ,Illinois Constitution of 1970 specifically provides for just
such interaction in article VI, section 17:
The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for an annual judicial conference to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the
administration of justice and shall report thereon annually in writing to the
General Assembly not later than January 31.75

This provision is implemented through Supreme Court Rule 61(c)(20)
which provides:
Legislation. A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation
of statutes, especially those relating to practice, and ascertain whether they
tend to expedite or impede the just disposition of controversies. Where it
is clear that he might contribute to the public welfare, he should advise
those in authority of his observation and experience in order-that they may
7
remedy defects of procedure. 6

and through Supreme Court Rule 41 (a):
Duties. There shall be a Judicial Conference to consider the business and
the problems pertaining to the administration of justice in this State, and
77
to make recommendations for its improvement.
In light of the above provisions, the Illinois Supreme Court should take
the initiative inthis area, rather than wait for legislative action, by recommending the institution and passage of the bills necessary for the scheme
of pre-emption presented above. The court has the greatest familiarity with

the nature of ordinance prosecutions, the deficiencies therein, and the kind
75. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1970).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 61(c)(20) (1973).
77. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 41(a) (1973).
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of remedial action necessary to eliminate these deficiencies. Such action
by the Illinois Supreme Court would not be violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers. The solution to the problems of revision of the procedures to be followed in ordinance prosecutions is uniquely within the
province of the Illinois Supreme Court. It is the responsibility of that
court to insure that the implementation of the changes necessary to effect a rational revision will be instituted in such a way as to promote the
greatest efficiency in judicial administration while protecting the rights of
those individuals who come before the system.
Those ordinances which are not pre-empted should be treated as purely
civil unless the individual local governmental body specifically demonstrates its intention that the ordinance in question be treated as criminal.
This aspect of reorganization can be effected through the adoption of additional Supreme Court Rules. These rules could state, in effect, that all
ordinances are to be treated as civil matters and handled under -the Civil
Practice Act. If the local body, specifically by law, enacted legislation
preserving the criminal nature of the offense regulated by the ordinance,
then that offense would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of Procedure. These rules could establish a six month time period in which the
local bodies could catalog and categorize their ordinances in order to come
to a decision as to which ordinances should be treated as criminal and
which as civil. The Supreme Court Rules could also establish guidelines
for the local governments to follow in this decisional process. The Rules
should also establish that any ordinances passed by home rule units pursuant to their power to imprison for up to six months under article VII,
section 6(e)(1) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,78 shall be prosecuted
under the Criminal Code of Procedure.
The Supreme Court Rules proposed in the preceding paragraph would
have the effect of forcing the local bodies to make a decision as to what
types of behavior they feel must be placed under criminal sanctions. The
six month period would allow the local government units the time to take
the necessary steps. In any event, even if a local body chose not to act
at all, the Supreme Court Rules would take effect, making those ordinance
violations not acted upon a matter of civil concern. This provides an opportunity for the decriminalization of regulatory measures and, more
broadly, an opportunity to examine the nature of local ordinances so as
to make a rational decision as to which ordinances are essentially criminal
in nature and which are essentially civil in nature, thereby determining
the mode of procedure. It should be noted that failure on the part of
78.

ILL. CONST.

art. VII, § 6(e)(1).
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the local authorities to designate an ordinance as criminal in nature would
result in the loss of the local body's arrest power under the ordinance.
This should provide a sufficient impetus to local governments to classify
their criminal ordinances as such, and, thus avoid the possibility of criminal ordinances falling under the Civil Practice Act.
The scheme proposed above for the revision of ordinance prosecution
in Illinois is the most rational approach to the problem and the only one
which completely meets the constitutional directives of due process and
equal protection. By pre-empting all duplications of state statutes, the
problems of selective and arbitrary enforcement at the discretion of the
local prosecutor or law enforcement official is eliminated. Requiring local
governmental units to make a decision as to whether specific ordinances are to be prosecuted under the Criminal Code or the Civil Practice
Act eliminates the uncertainty as to what procedures are to be applied
in the prosecution of ordinance violation cases. It also obviates the necessity of trying to bring together all the non-related matters covered by
ordinances under one system of procedure. The rationality of the classification of ordinances and the certainty that would result, would immeasurably improve the quality of justice in the prosecution of ordinance cases
in Illinois.
Few citizens ever have contact with the higher courts. In the main, it is
the police and the lower court Bench and Bar that convey the essence of
our democracy to the people. Justice, if it can be measured, must be measured by the experience the average citizen has with the police and the
lower courts.

79

CONCLUSION

The area of ordinance prosecution has been a nagging problem to the
judiciary for many years. Attempts to solve the constitutional problems
of due process and equal protection inherent in the present mode of
handling ordinance cases on a case-by-case method, have proved unavailing. In fact, the attempts to rationalize this system, although well meaning, have actually increased the confusion as to the procedural structure
to be applied by the courts in the litigation of ordinance violations. As
the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, the present procedures followed
in ordinance cases must be abandoned and a rational, unified system must
be adopted in order to eliminate the confusion that presently exists. The
authors believe that the following proposals will achieve the desired result1. Pre-emption of all ordinances duplicating state statutes.
79. Murphy, The Role of the Police in Our Modern Society, 26 THE RECoRD oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 292, 293 (1971).
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2. The prosecution of all ordinances under the Civil Practice Act unless
specifically designated as criminal ordinances by the local governing
bodies.
3. The prosecution of all criminal ordinances under the Criminal Code
of Procedure.
-the judiciary
It is uniquely appropriate, indeed, it is incumbent upon
that the requirements of
that action be taken in this area so as to insure
due process. and equal protection are satisfied, and to eliminate the disarray in this area of Illinois jurisprudence.
Gordon V. Levine
Ceil Misles Reinglass

APPENDIX
A.

PROPOSED SUPREME COURT RULE:

a. The procedure to be followed in the prosecution of all ordinance
violations shall be as dictated by.the Civil Practice Act.
b. Where the local body wishes, it may enact legislation preserving the
criminal nature of an ordinance. These ordinances shall be prosecuted
under the Criminal Code of Procedure. In all subsequent legislation in
which a local body wishes to enact a criminal ordinance and retain the
power of arrest, the Criminal Code of Procedure shall apply.
c. The local governmental unit shall. have six months time in which to
enact legislation preserving the criminal nature of an ordinance.
*d. Ordinance violations which are not specifically treated as criminal
by local governmental units shall be handled as civil actions subject to
the Civil Practice Act.
B.

PROPOSED STATUTE PRE-EMPTING DUPLICATION OF THE
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE:

"An Act providing for the exclusive exercise by the State of the power
to prosecute for the commission of all offenses specified in the Illinois'
Criminal Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973).
"Purpose: To insure that the protections of the Criminal, Code ofProcedure are granted 'to all defendants in prosecutions arising out of be-.
havior regulated by the Criminal Code of Illinois, and to promote efficiency and essential fairness in the administration of justice within this
State.
'Be it enacted by the People of the State of'Illinois, represented in the
GeneralAssembly:.,, '

-. .

-

"
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Section 1. Pursuant to paragraph (h) of section 6 of article VII of
the Constitution of 1970, the power to make criminal all acts covered by
the Illinois Criminal Code shall be exercised exclusively by the State and
may not be exercised by any unit of local government, including home
rule units.
Section 2. Section 1 of this Act shall not be construed to deny to any
unit of local government, including home rule units, the power to punish
by imprisonment up to six months for offenses not pre-empted.
Section 3. This Act shall become effective six months after.the date
of its enactment.".
C.

PROPOSED STATUTE PRE-EMPTING DUPLICATION OF THE
ILLINOIS VEHICLE CODE:

"An Act providing for the exclusive exercise by the State of the power
to prosecute for the commission of all offenses specified in the Illinois
Vehicle Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 95Y2 (1973).
"Purpose: To insure that the protections of the Illinois Civil Practice Act are granted to all defendants. in prosecutions arising out of-behavior regulated by the Illinois Vehicle Code; to eliminate the inherent,
arbitrary exercise of discretion which results from enforcement under a
dual system of traffic regulation, and to promote efficiency and uniformity
in the administration of justice within this State.
"Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the.
GeneralAssembly:
Section 1. Pursuant to paragraph (h) of section 6 of article VII of
the Constitution of 1970, the power to regulate all offenses covered by
the Illinois Vehicle-Code, shall be exercised exclusively-by the State and
may not be exercised by any unit of local government, including home
rule units.
Section 2. The right to receive revenues produced from the enforcement of the Illinois 'Vehicle Code shall be granted to the local governmental body initiating the action.
Section 3. This Act shall become effective six months after. the date
of its, enactment."

